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ABSTRACT
Politics, and by extension states, are marginal in debates about the genesis,
evolution and functioning of the global value chain (GVC)-based global
economy. We contend here that the core complexity of state agency and
state power needs to be much more carefully understood in GVC and
related debates, as a basis on which the governance of the evolving GVC
world can be properly theorised as revolving around the inseparability of
economic and political power. We advance a framework for understanding
the role of politics and states in the construction and maintenance of a
GVC world, using a three-fold typology of facilitative, regulatory and
distributive forms of governance, and propose a notion of ‘outsourcing
governance’ as an attempt to capture the ways in which states
purposefully, through active political agency, have engaged in a process of
delegating a variety of governance functions and authority to private
actors. Our overarching argument is normative: ‘outsourced governance’ of
the form we currently observe is associated with regressive distributional
outcomes, and is antithetical to an inclusive and sustainable global economy.
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The increasingly voluminous literature on global value chains (GVCs) and the closely related concept
of global production networks (GPNs)1 has called for renewed concern in political economy with the
form of industrial organisation that underpins the contemporary global economy. The literature is
characterised by fierce debate on how what we call here a ‘GVC world’ functions, but is essentially
united in its understanding of how it came about. It is understood in the broadest sense as emerging
from the strategies of transnational corporations (TNCs) to create and capture value, in the context of
an erosion of state power in a globalising economy. In other words, the driver of change is the econ-
omic globalisation process, and its logic is inter-firm competition. Much attention in a parallel litera-
ture is also paid to the emergence of ‘private governance’, thought to fill the void created by a global
economy at least partially dis-embedded from state institutions of governance. ‘Private governance’
is usually seen as arising largely from the interplay between non-governmental organisations (NGOs)
and firms, with states depicted merely as bystanders. Across the board, in other words, politics, and
by extension states, are marginal in debates about the genesis, evolution and functioning of the GVC-
based global economy. With some honourable exceptions (as in all generalisations), it is fair to say
that they tend to be incorporated into theory and analysis only in perfunctory terms, and are con-
sidered largely to fall outside the core concerns of GVC scholarship. It is not perhaps irrelevant to
observe in this respect that the bulk of GVC/GPN scholarship has emanated from the fields of econ-
omic sociology, economic geography, development studies and international business, and that
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there has been strikingly little participation in the associated debates from political economists
working in the traditions of political science or international relations.
Our starting point in this paper is thus that it is time to think much more carefully about the cen-
trality of politics in a GVC world, and particularly the role of states in the creation and maintenance of
it. We echo the arguments of an important and unfortunately still rather inconspicuous strand of the
literature, which seeks rightly to understand GVCs as both economic and political phenomena (Levy
2008). We contend that GVCs need to be theorised carefully in political economy terms, revolving
around the inseparability of economic and political power. Such a contention opens up an expansive
subject matter, both theoretical and empirical, which is necessarily beyond the scope of a single
paper. Our ‘cut’ into it in the present contribution relates to states and state power, which we aim
to rescue from their position of ongoing neglect in current debates about GVCs and surrounding
questions of governance.
In pursuing this aspiration, we advance a sympathetic challenge to the two key literatures in which
debates about governance in global production have unfolded. The first is the GVC literature itself,
which has retained a strongly firm-centric character. In that literature, the term ‘governance’ is
used predominantly to refer to governance by lead firms of suppliers within the value chain
(Gereffi 1994: 96): ‘the concrete practices, power dynamics, and organisational forms that give char-
acter and structure to cross-border business networks’ (Ponte and Sturgeon 2014: 200). In this litera-
ture, power is a central concept, but it refers to power relations between firms, particularly between
buyers and suppliers. This perspective is indispensable to GVC analysis, but, in our view, the con-
ception of ‘the political’ that it mobilises is too narrow to capture the intrinsically political nature
of GVCs and the governance of a GVC-based global economy. This is not to say that there is no rec-
ognition of the importance of states and public authority in the GVC literature. Adopting the focus
noted above, Stefano Ponte and Tim Sturgeon take care to acknowledge the need for the ‘more
ambitious analysis of how, overall, GVC governance is mutually constituted by broader institutional,
regulatory and societal processes’ (Ponte and Sturgeon 2014: 197). Indeed, such a recognition was
intended as one of the contributions of a notion of GPNs as a suggested improvement on the
chain metaphor in GVC analysis (Henderson et al. 2002, Coe et al. 2008). It is nevertheless fair to
say that, on the one hand, conspicuously little work has acted robustly upon this recognition, and,
on the other, states and public authority are typically cast as reactive to the phenomenon of GVCs.
The second body of scholarship with which our interests intersect is the burgeoning literature on
private governance, and more recently hybrid forms of public–private governance. Building on earlier
debates about corporate social responsibility (CSR), this literature takes as its primary focus the ascen-
dance of private actors in regulatory governance. An extensive body of work documents the govern-
ance strategies pursued by firms in GVCs, including corporate codes of conduct, auditing regimes,
social and environmental labelling, and product and social standards (see Esbenshade 2012), along-
side parallel interests in private standard setting in the global economy (e.g. Büthe and Mattli 2011).
Private governance is generally thought to have arisen without significant agency by the state, as a
result of pressure from societal groups on private firms. The political relationships of primary interest
are most often those of firms with consumers and civil society organisations (MacDonald 2014). Parts
of this body of work have nevertheless embraced a welcome and valuable concern with how public
and private forms of governance interact, especially in the transnational arena. While much of this
literature invokes an idea of the ‘return’ of the state, on the basis of a problematic presumption
that it was once absent, nevertheless valuable insight is offered into how states have shaped the poli-
tics of private governance.
On this basis, our aim in this article is to advance a framework for understanding the role of politics
and states in the construction andmaintenance of a GVC world. The argument is premised on a three-
fold typology of the forms of governance that markets typically require: facilitative, regulatory and dis-
tributive forms of governance (Gereffi and Mayer 2006). Our first argument concerns the role of the
state in facilitating the emergence and spread of GVCs. Rather than being either absent entirely or, at
most, unwitting enablers of GVCs, states are to a great extent the intentional architects of the GVC
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world. GVCs have flourished through the structures and modes of governance purposefully facilitated
by powerful states since the 1970s.
Our second argument concerns the role of the state in outsourcing regulatory governance. The
emergence of private governance has usually been seen as the product of pressure from societal
groups responding to deficiencies of public regulation, a vision in which states played little part.
We argue, however, that states have played an important role both in driving the public deregulatory
agenda and in actively promoting private regulatory regimes.
Our third argument concerns the role of states in outsourcing distributive governance. A conse-
quence of the emergence of GVCs, whatever their advantages in terms of efficiency of production,
is the concentration of wealth in the hands of those with power in the chain. Usually, the argument
is that states have simply lacked the capacity to respond to the inequitable distribution of wealth and
the consequences of that inequality. We argue, however, that states have not only chosen not to
adopt such policies, but have in some cases engaged in promoting inequality, usually in the name
of ‘competitiveness’, through less progressive tax policies, relaxation of competition policy and
reductions in social programmes.
Our final argument is normative: outsourced governance of the form we currently observe will not
produce an inclusive and sustainable global economy. Private governance – whether facilitating the
pattern of economic production and exchange, regulating the environmental and social impacts of
that economic activity or certainly addressing its distributional consequences – can be part of the
solution but it will never be sufficient. It follows from our prior arguments, however, that as architects
of the global system, states retain significant power to shape it in ways that remedy this situation.
What is needed, therefore, is a new politics that re-engages the state in the essential task of govern-
ing the global economy. There are some signs that this may be emerging: much is made of the resur-
gence of industrial policy, particularly in emerging economies, as a possible indication of a newmode
of economic governance characterised by more interventionist states. Yet we consider such a con-
clusion to remain premature: if it is in evidence in a meaningful sense, this resurgence is limited to
a small number of states; moreover, there is little evidence as yet that it extends beyond facilitative
governance into the realms of distributive governance, nor that it is as yet consistent with a progress-
ive agenda for inclusive and sustainable development.
Two caveats are in order before proceeding. The first is that we are not denying the agency or
power of private actors – far from it. We fully recognise that corporations, in particular, as well as
other non-governmental actors, possess and exercise vast structural power in the global political
economy and have considerable influence over the behaviour of states. Clearly, there is also a dom-
estic politics to state behaviour. Constrained within the confines of a single paper, however, our point
for present purposes is that politics in a GVC world are not reducible to a set of societal interests, nor
to the dynamics of corporate power within GVCs. Inasmuch as it is through the state that those inter-
ests find expression, the institutions and agency of the state matter.
The second caveat is that our language refers to states in general. However, we recognise the
hazards of generalisation. Not all states were central to the political genesis of the GVC world. Never-
theless, the realities of GVCs as the predominant global economic structures for production and trade,
and the fact that the GVC framework has become a contemporary development mantra, mean that
all states are now engaged in the process of negotiating the power dynamics that crystallise in and
around GVCs. This has led to the emergence of varied sets of governance arrangements, reflecting
contingent modes of entwinement between public and private governance, and more broadly
between economic and political power. Inevitably, we cannot reflect the scale of variation and con-
tingency in this single paper, and our efforts here are predominantly oriented to providing a frame-
work within which the politics of governance can be theorised and analysed.
The first section engages with the literature on states and governance to flesh out our argument
that states and politics need to be rescued from their neglect in contemporary GVC/GPN scholarship.
The following three sections address the three dimensions of our governance typology, in turn facil-
itative, regulatory and distributive governance, exploring the dynamics of the process of outsourcing
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governance in a GVC world. A conclusion pulls the threads together and makes a normative argu-
ment about the inadequacy of outsourced governance and the need, therefore, for a political
solution.
The myth of the powerless state
In the late 1990s, Linda Weiss challenged what she saw to be a ‘phenomenon of state denial’ in glo-
balisation debates (Weiss 1998). She, with others, documented the widespread assumption that
states had withered away under the assault of economic globalisation, or else had assumed a position
in which they could comfortably be afforded secondary interest, or indeed none at all, in understand-
ing patterns of global restructuring. This orthodoxy was subjected to sustained challenge and con-
testation, as all orthodoxies are, but nevertheless imposed what Peter Evans called a ‘pervasive
belief that the institutional centrality of the state is incompatible with globalization’ (1997: 70).
Other parts of the literature on globalisation have not been guilty of state denial as such, but
nevertheless have sought to trace and understand the presumed undermining of the authority of
states and the emergence of new and important systems of private authority in global governance.
Those whose interest in private authority is rooted in the study of international relations, multilater-
alism and global governance have tended to focus on the manner in which the governance functions
traditionally exercised by public authorities are progressively ‘privatised’ and assumed by private
actors (e.g. Cutler et al. 1999, Hall and Biersteker 2002, Graz and Nolke 2008, Büthe and Mattli
2011, Green 2014), with the corollary assumption that public governance is being squeezed or
eroded by private governance. John Ruggie took a somewhat different stance, arguing that there
has been no clear shift away from public governance to private governance, but rather that a
public domain, partially dis-embedded from the state, is being ‘reconstituted’ at the global level.
In his view a parallel and new ‘transnational world of transaction flows’ has left behind ‘the
slower-moving, state-mediated inter-national world of arm’s length economic transactions and tra-
ditional international legal mechanisms, even as they still depend on that world for their licences
to operate and to protect their property rights’ (Ruggie 2004: 503).
Throughout most of the globalisation literature, it is striking that states are largely present as
passive actors, and the primary concern is to depict what is happening to states as a consequence
of processes in other arenas. Even in Ruggie’s important argument, states are not significant actors
in the making of this new world of transnational flows. The agents and demandeurs are private
and societal actors; states are depicted as performing the residual functions of providing the legal
and political underpinnings of the new multi-nodal form of global governance. Similarly in the
context of Asian development, long the thorn in the side of state denial, recent scholarship has
emphasised a ‘dis-embedding’ narrative, wherein Asian firms have become ‘gradually dis-embedded
from state apparatuses and re-embedded in different global production networks governed by com-
petitive inter-firm dynamics’ (Yeung 2014: 70).
It would not be unfair to say that, as the popularity of the GVC framework has grown, it has been a
means by which the imprint of state denial has remained strong in contemporary debates on global
economic governance. One of the key projects in GVC analysis and its precursors in commodity chain
research was to ‘decentre’ the state in order, innovatively, to focus on transnational processes (Bartley
2007: 341). Some scholarship does stress the need to incorporate power, politics and states, and
indeed the role of states in creating the conditions in which GVCs emerged has attracted some
insightful attention (e.g. Bair and Gereffi 2001, Gibbon and Ponte 2005). As noted, one of the flagship
contributions of the GPN framework, in response to perceived shortcomings of the GVC approach,
was to open up more theoretical and analytical space for states, institutions and power. However,
this promise has not yet been realised. Power relations have remained conceived in predominantly
economic terms, and the theorisation of power primarily centres on firms as agents (Dallas 2015) that
seek to generate economic rents in GVCs (Kaplinsky 2005; Levy 2008: 945). While this perspective is
indispensable to understanding facets of power relations within GVCs, it is built on a limited
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conception of the political, and it marginalises the agency of states in accounts of the evolution of the
GVC world.
A second literature, on private governance and corporate responsibility, typically starts from
similar assumptions about the hollowing out of public authority in the global economy, leaving a gov-
ernance void into which private governance has been propelled by pressures from societal actors.
Particularly in relation to labour and environmental standards, the dominant governance agents
are now assumed to be private corporate actors putting in place a mode of ‘transnational private
regulation’ (Bartley 2007), whose relationship with public governance remains the subject of
debate. Such outcomes have been lamented by many, arguing that private governance cannot be
considered an effective or legitimate substitute for public governance, and that public and private
governance can be, increasingly are, and need to be complementary (Mayer and Gereffi 2010,
Vogel 2010, Esbenshade 2012, Locke 2013). The assumption nevertheless often remains that
private governance is in the ascendant (and has been for some time), and that public authority is
increasingly compressed by private governance. Consequently, the politics of a GVC world are
often depicted in this literature as being merely about the interaction between civil society,
notably NGOs, and private corporate actors (MacDonald 2014). These dynamics are unquestionably
at work. However, in privileging them, much of the literature has missed the extent to which states
have been and remain complicit in their own withdrawal, through an active process of delegating
authority and functions to private actors. The emergence of interesting forms of public–private gov-
ernance is not, in this sense, about the ‘return’ or ‘resurgence’ of the state, but about a complex, and
indeed contradictory, reconfiguration of how public and private authority are entwined with one
another.
In the sections that follow we develop a different interpretation of the political economy of gov-
ernance in a GVC world, which aims to pull politics and states into the centre of the picture.
States as architects of the GVC world: facilitative governance
Our first claim is that far from being bystanders at the creation of the GVC world, states were its
primary architects. The global economic regime that enabled the rise of – and continues to
support – GVCs did not simply spontaneously appear; rather, it was established by states, acting
both collectively and unilaterally, and is continually enabled by states. In this sense, states continue
to play a central role in facilitative governance, defined as policies that support the formation and
operation of GVCs.
Our stance is consistent with the insights of some of the early critical literature on globalisation,
which challenged the ‘retreat of the state’ orthodoxy outlined above. In criticising the claim that glo-
balisation was undermining states, these critics argued that globalisation was a political and ideologi-
cal project that was ‘authored’, engineered and maintained by states themselves (e.g. Helleiner 1994,
Amoore et al. 1997, Evans 1997, Weiss 1998). Robert Cox conceptualised this process as one in which
states represented the ‘transmission belts’ through which the ideological and political forces associ-
ated with the neo-liberal project were given concrete expression through institutional restructuring
and policy reform (1987). Within the literature on policy reform, in a similar vein, Miles Kahler noted
an ‘orthodox paradox’: neo-liberal policies that limited government intervention depended paradoxi-
cally on the presence of strong national state institutions and a strengthening of the state itself
(Kahler 1990). All of these perspectives insisted on the need to understand states not as being
eroded by globalisation, but instead as driving the process of globalisation. Backed up by an exten-
sive literature in comparative and institutionalist political economy challenging the notion of conver-
gence, the suggestion was that a focus on the decline of the state was misplaced: the relevant
question was not the degree of ‘stateness’ but rather the nature of ‘stateness’ in the context of glo-
balisation (Phillips 2005: 97).
These insights can valuably be extended to the more specific context of the GVC world. Rather
than being mere reactors to the phenomenon of GVCs, states were – and remain – central in the
138 F. W. MAYER AND N. PHILLIPS
constellation of political forces and interests that has enabled them to emerge and take form. To
understand the ways in which states have facilitated the rise of GVCs, it is useful first to recognise
what forms of governance these structures and networks require. The essential characteristic of a
GVC is a fragmented production process in which, typically, some or all of the stages of production
are outsourced by lead firms to geographically dispersed suppliers and sub-suppliers. GVCs, there-
fore, require low barriers to trade, secure property rights, including investment and intellectual prop-
erty protections, and tolerance for concentrations of market power. This is precisely the environment
that states have created. Among the specific actions taken by states have been international agree-
ments promoting free trade and strengthening investment and intellectual property rights, national
and international development strategies premised on liberalisation and deregulation, and systema-
tic loosening of competition policies.
Trade, investment and intellectual property agreements
Beginning in the late 1980s with the launch of the multilateral trade negotiations that created the
World Trade Organization (WTO), through the negotiation in the 1990s of a growing number of
regional free trade agreements (FTAs), and then with gathering velocity the negotiation a proliferat-
ing patchwork of bilateral FTAs mostly between developed and developing countries, states engaged
in a dramatic lowering of the barriers to trade, particularly in manufactured goods. The ambitious
multilateral trade negotiation that culminated in the creation of the WTO in 1995 represented a con-
siderable enlargement of the scope of previous trade agreements, both in terms of the issues covered
(non-tariff barriers as well as tariffs, agriculture as well as manufacturing), the strength of the regime
(binding obligations with a judicial procedure to help enforce them), and, particularly, the inclusion of
much of the developing world in the disciplines of the trade regime. Alongside the multilateral
process, the push for greater openness in trade crystallised in a proliferation of regional and bilateral
FTAs.
For the US, the 1994 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was pivotal, marking the
beginning of a series of agreements with developing countries: the Central American Free Trade
Agreement with Central America (which was signed in 2004 and entered into force in 2006), and bilat-
eral agreements with myriad nations in the hemisphere and beyond. Over the 2000s, the US entered
into bilateral FTAs with, among others, Jordan (2001), Singapore (2004), Panama (2007), Peru (2009),
Morocco (2006), Bahrain (2006), Colombia (2006), Chile (2004) and Oman (2009), as well as a more
limited textile agreement with Cambodia. All told, the US now is party to 20 FTAs (USTR 2015).
The European Union (EU) has been equally busy, negotiating bilateral FTAs with such countries as
Mexico, Israel, Morocco and South Africa (all in 2000) as well as Jordan, Chile, Lebanon and Singapore.
It is now part of more than 30 FTAs in total. Japan, too, has been in the same business, and now is
party to 14 FTAs (WTO 2015a). In addition, preferential trade arrangements give preferred access
to developed country markets for goods coming from particular developing countries. The EU has
such arrangements with virtually all of sub-Saharan Africa, as well as with Central America, and
parts of Latin America and South Asia. The US has agreements with much of Africa and the
Andean nations of South America (WTO 2015b).
These trade agreements deviate from ‘free trade’ in at least two important ways, both of which
tend to entrench the GVC as the form of global production. The first is the inclusion of rules of
origin in FTAs, which determine how much of a product’s total value needs be produced by
parties in the agreement in order to receive preferential treatment (such as a lower tariff rate). The
NAFTA, for example, has rules of origin for automobiles and textiles that specify how much of a
car or a garment needs to be produced in North America in order to qualify for lower rates. An inten-
tional consequence of these rules is that they facilitate the establishment of value chains within North
America (Mayer 1998, Bair and Gereffi 2001). It is perhaps telling that agreements involving the US or
the EU with developing countries, such as NAFTA or the EU-Mexico FTA, tend to have more restrictive
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rules of origin that do agreements among developing countries (Brenton 2011), the effect of which is
at once to enable regional value chains and to protect them from external competition.
A second feature of trade agreements is that often they include residual protection that reinforces
lead firm location in developed countries and limits the ability of suppliers in developing countries to
shift to higher value-added production. This is perhaps most pronounced in agricultural production,
where higher tariff rates remain on finished products than on commodities, an arrangement known
as tariff escalation. Elamin and Khaira (2003: 101) find that tariff escalation is most pronounced in
‘commodity sectors such as meat, sugar, fruit, coffee, cocoa, and hides and skins, most of which
are of export interest to many of the poor developing countries’. Mohan et al. (2013) find that
although developing countries are the primary producers of coffee, tea and cocoa, the majority of
manufacturing and processing happens outside of the producing countries, thus depriving develop-
ing countries of value capture.
In addition to trade provisions, states have also created international rules governing investor
rights. Such rules are now almost always included as part of FTAs. In addition, there has been a
proliferation of stand-alone bilateral investment treaties (BITs). The US is now party to 40 such
agreements, the EU to 52. Counting both BITs and FTAs with investment provisions, there are
now more than 2000 investment agreements in force around the world (UNCTAD 2015). For
developing countries, agreeing to investor rights provisions is clearly part of an effort to attract
foreign investment more generally (Elkins et al. 2006). But, by strengthening investor rights,
these provisions also serve to reinforce a business environment conducive to the functioning
of GVCs.
Development policies of states and international organisations
As has been exhaustively documented, beginning in the debt crises of the 1980s, neo-liberal advo-
cates in Washington and London, working though the World Bank and the International Monetary
Fund, pushed an agenda of free trade, privatisation of state-owned enterprises and deregulation
as the path to development. As the Bank and the Fund became drawn into the effort to contain
the economic crisis by lending to countries, they conditioned their support on the adoption of
neo-liberal policies they preferred. Given the dire financial and economic situation of many develop-
ing countries, particularly in Latin America, the international organisations had enormous leverage as
they demanded ‘structural adjustment’ in the form of reduced public spending, privatisation and
market opening. As Collier and Gunning (1999: F634) note, ‘the task thus went beyond the conven-
tional one of rectifying a crisis, to reorienting a development strategy’.
The net effect of these policies was to enlarge the domain of the global market in ways that
enabled the growth of GVCs. But, in recent years, the development policies of both major inter-
national organisations and national development agencies have become explicitly concerned
with promoting GVCs. In a remarkably short time period, the concept of GVCs has entered
the thinking of practitioners at both national development agencies and international organis-
ations (Milberg and Winkler 2013, Gereffi 2014, Gereffi and Mayer forthcoming). Beginning in the
mid-2000s with interest at the International Labour Organization (ILO), the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and other international organisations in
finding an alternative to neo-liberal orthodoxies, then taken up with alacrity by the WTO, the
development banks, and other international organisations in response to the financial crisis
that began in 2008, GVCs are now central to the discourse through the international develop-
ment community.
To a large extent, much of the debate about the relevance of GVCs to development now accepts
the proposition that private firms will be the drivers, and revolves around questions of how to
connect to GVCs and to facilitate economic ‘upgrading’ within them. The World Bank, for example,
states that
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[p]articipation in global value chains (GVCs), the international fragmentation of production, can lead to increased
job creation and economic growth… The World Bank Group is helping developing countries catch the GVC wave
and realize the benefits GVCs can deliver. (World Bank 2015)
According to a report from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD),
WTO and World Bank Group,
GVCs are becoming increasingly influential in determining future trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) pat-
terns, as well as growth opportunities. Policy needs to respond to this new reality and promote a business
environment that not only makes a country attractive for location of GVCs, but also facilitates upgrading oppor-
tunities over time. (OECD/WTO/World Bank 2014)
USAID has several hundred GVC reports and documents on its website, demonstrating the extent to
which it now views development assistance through that lens. UNCTAD strikes a somewhat more
cautious note, although still seeing GVCs as central to the challenge of development:
Countries need to make a strategic choice to promote or not to promote participation in GVCs. They need to care-
fully weigh the pros and cons of GVC participation and the costs and benefits of proactive policies to promote
GVCs or GVC-led development strategies, in line with their specific situation and factor endowments. (UNCTAD
2013: xi)
A significant portion of development assistance now falls under the heading of ‘aid for trade,’ an
initiative launched in the mid-2000s as part of the effort to build support among developing
countries for the Doha Round trade negotiations of the WTO. Initially, aid for trade was largely uncon-
nected to the GVC discourse, but, after the financial crisis of 2008, aid for trade increasingly became
nearly synonymous with promoting connections to GVCs and upgrading within them. The introduc-
tion to the biennial review of aid for trade jointly published by the WTO and the OECD in 2013, for
example, states that:
The trade and development landscape has changed since the start of the Initiative. Research on trade in value
added – led by the WTO and the OECD – is shedding light on the complex production networks that now charac-
terize global trade. The deepening and widening of value chains has boosted the share of intermediate goods in
trade as more firms and countries join these diffuse networks. As firms focus more on trade in certain specific
tasks and less on the complete production process, new opportunities arise for firms in developing countries,
including in the least developed countries, to become part of these regional and global networks. (OECD/WTO
2013: 3)
The subsequent OECD/WTO report in 2015 makes clear that the goal of aid for trade is to lower the
costs of trading so that developing countries can enjoy the beneﬁts of greater trade speciﬁcally by
enabling local producers to connect to GVCs. Along with various investments in trade facilitation,
it advocates close collaboration between private and public sectors to ‘ensure that efforts tackle
the value chain-related constraints’ (OECD/WTO 2015: 24).
The push for GVC supportive policies comes not only from the advanced industrial states, but also
from many developing states as well. Brazil, China, Kazakhstan and Costa Rica are just a few of the
many governments that are now using GVC analysis to inform their national industrial policy and
economic development strategies (Gereffi 2013). GVC references are increasingly common in
many national development strategies submitted to the World Bank demonstrating the considerable
extent to which the dominance of GVCs has been reinforced by organisations and governments
through the mechanisms of development policy.
The decline of competition policy
The third illustration of facilitative governance we wish to highlight concerns the growing tolerance
for market concentration and the diminution of competition policy at national and international
levels, manifested particularly in a greater willingness to accept the high levels of market power
that characterise lead firms in GVCs. This global trend towards the increasing concentration of
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market power appears to be evident in many sectors (Bikker and Haaf 2002, Nolan et al. 2002, Milberg
2004, UNCTAD 2006). Examples include retailing (where Walmart, Amazon and Alibaba have enor-
mous scale), office software and operating systems (where Microsoft is so dominant), smartphones
(where Samsung and Apple dominate the market), beer (where three producers control 40 per
cent of global production), large commercial aircraft (where Boeing and Airbus control virtually
the entire market), soft drinks (where Coca-Cola has nearly 50 per cent of global consumption)
and credit card networks (where Visa and MasterCard together account for nearly three-quarters
of all transactions). Milberg and Winkler (2013: 114) document the extent of market concentration
in commercial aircraft, automobile production, computer software, electronic goods and many con-
sumer goods, including soft drinks. In addition, enormous state-owned enterprises, notably Chinese
and Russian, operate in the petro-chemical sector. A related issue is the expansion of intellectual
property protections, by definition forms of (usually temporary) monopoly power, particularly in
the high technology sector (Kovacic 2012).
The implication of the rise in market concentration is an increase in monopolistic and monopso-
nistic market power (Milberg and Winkler 2013: 115). Even if there is relatively little market power in
the end market, market power upstream can allow for the generation of rents, and there is good
reason to believe that these concentrations result in considerable market power within GVCs, as sup-
pliers face limited numbers of buyers for their goods (a form of monopsony power), while buyers,
often, have many potential suppliers. The consequence is highly unequal ability to capture the
value created in GVCs, and the concentration of wealth in ever fewer hands. According to Oxfam,
as of 2016, only 62 people own half the world’s assets (Oxfam 2016).
The causes of the trend towards greater concentration are complex, but the increased tolerance
for industry concentration in many developed and emerging economies, the lack of well-established
competition policy in many developing countries, and the failure of states to negotiate a strong
global competition policy seem likely to have contributed significantly. Every business naturally
strives to find ways to limit competition for itself. Indeed, the fragmentation of production that
characterises GVCs represents efforts by lead firms to outsource those aspects of production that
are most competitive (and therefore least profitable) and to focus on those that are least competitive
(and therefore most profitable). To check this tendency, competition policy as it has developed in the
US and Western Europe has traditionally sought to limit concentration in order to protect consumers
(Fox and Crane 2010). However, while there remains a rhetorical commitment to ensuring compe-
tition, there seems in the contemporary period to be a growing inclination towards mergers and a
greater tolerance of their consequences for competition.
That states might be tempted at minimum to look the other way when their national firms enjoy
global market power, or even more actively to promote the power of its firms in global competition,
has been long understood (Krugman 1986). In the GVC world, that temptation has grown. Indeed,
promotion of national firms with market power has become the explicit policy of many developing
states, which recognise that being the home of low value-added (or low-value-capturing) suppliers
does less to promote economic growth than being the home of a higher value-added/capturing
lead firm. Given these incentives, global competition policy is something of a public good that
requires international cooperation to achieve. Yet states have failed to agree on global competition
policy. In part, perhaps, this may reflect a tendency to imagine that globalisation and trade by defi-
nition increase competition (Hoekman and Holmes 1999). But efforts to negotiate competition policy
in the WTO also failed because they met with strenuous opposition from many states, particularly
China.
We have suggested thus far not only that states were active architects of the GVC world, but also
that they remain actively engaged in forms of facilitative governance designed to consolidate its
underpinning structures of market power. A subtle point about the outsourcing of facilitation is
that firms, not states, now play the major role in determining what will be produced where and
on what terms, and what will be traded internationally. To a great extent, global patterns of pro-
duction that were once strongly shaped by the constellation of trade rules and other state policies
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are now artefacts of value chain governance. Indeed, while the architects of the neo-liberal globalisa-
tion project envisaged a world of free market competition, what has instead emerged has been a
‘highly leveraged form of managed trade’ in which lead firms control production, not markets or
states, and in which the value in the system is captured by the most powerful actors within it
(Gereffi and Mayer forthcoming). In other words, global market engagement has shifted ‘from a
passive process involving the reaction of independent actors to market signals, as in international
trade theories, to a set of industrial transformations constructed within system-wide dynamics of
coordination and control by economic and non-economic actors’ (Neilson et al. 2014: 1) – a
process to which states, and the mobilisation of state authority, have been central.
States and private authority: regulatory governance
Our second major claim concerns the privatisation of regulatory governance. It is that the rise of
private governance is, in important measure, directly the result of the state-driven project of reshap-
ing the relationship between states and markets, and between public and private authority. The
emergence of private governance is often construed as a response to a deficit of governance. The
logic is Polanyian: markets became dis-embedded from social institutions, creating something of a
deficit of governance, which triggered a ‘second movement’ in the form of civil society pressures
on corporations to improve their practices. But the rise of private governance is not merely the con-
sequence of an ‘absence’ of public governance or the decline of state capacities. Rather, it is also the
result of a political and ideological project that states themselves were central to constructing, and
which they continue to enable. In other words, the pre-eminence of private governance is in part the
result of a process of structural change associated with economic globalisation and the emergence of
a GVC world (itself an artefact of state choice), but it is also, and importantly, the consequence of pol-
itical choices made by both states and private actors, influenced by particular ideological precepts,
concerning the desired mode of global economic governance. A focus on the ‘political construction
of market institutions’ (Bartley 2007) is therefore necessary to understand regulatory governance in
the GVC/GPN world.
It has been well documented that the functions of regulatory governance have been assumed
increasingly by private actors, especially in relation to labour and environmental standards (Mayer
and Gereffi 2010, Vogel 2010, Büthe and Mattli 2011, Esbenshade 2012, Haufler 2013, Locke 2013,
Auld 2014, LeBaron and Lister 2015). Private actors are increasingly cast as regulators, important
development actors and agents of global justice. Often this is characterised as a partially unintended
consequence of globalisation and the lack of effective international systems of governance, and/or
the result of low levels of regulatory capacity on the part of states in those countries and regions
that have been drawn increasingly into globalised production structures.
In part, it is indeed the case that global deregulation represents a by-product of the shift of pro-
duction from locations with strong regulatory regimes to countries in which governments have
limited bargaining power vis-à-vis powerful TNCs, and/or limited enforcement capacity as a result
of institutional weakness and lack of resources. In the case of the disaster of Rana Plaza, for instance
– the garment factory in Dhaka, Bangladesh, which collapsed in April 2013, killing 1135 workers –
garment production that might previously have taken place in more regulated states was now
taking place in a location with much more limited inclination to regulate or enforce and less state
capacity to ensure worker rights and safe working conditions. It is undoubtedly the case that globa-
lised market forces can overwhelm the ability of states to regulate. At the extreme, in such cases as
illegal logging, wildcat mining and drug cartels, economic activity may take place completely outside
the regulatory reach of the state. Even in less dramatic instances, a great deal of production in con-
temporary value chains, particularly low-wage, labour-intensive work in agriculture, garments and
other sectors takes place beyond the reach of regulatory coverage.
Several objections to this interpretation are nevertheless important. First, trade deals not only
lowered tariffs and other impediments to free trade, they also circumscribed the ability of states
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to limit imports based on failures to regulate elsewhere. Although environmental and health pro-
visions in trade agreements typically allow for restrictions when there are environment or health
impacts in the importing country, they severely limit the ability of states to impose restrictions
based on practices in the exporting country. Only in extreme cases, such as documented use of
child or forced labour, or in the case of trade in endangered species (under CITES), are such restric-
tions allowable under WTO rules.
Second, in the competition to attract foreign investment and to increase their exports, developing
countries have incentives to be the low cost point in GVCs. This in turn translates into incentives for
governments to limit regulatory costs for producers, as well as to keep wages ‘competitive’ and to
restrict workers’ ability to organise. Similarly, enforcement mechanisms remain either underdeve-
loped or not implemented. Labour inspection systems are usually partial in their coverage, in part
because of limited resources, but also because of deliberate decisions to make them so. Ample evi-
dence suggests that inspection systems are sometimes actively hindered by state authorities (see ILO
2006, Deshingkar 2009). National legislation often also reflects the politics of outsourcing govern-
ance. For instance, most forms of home work in India remain unregulated as they exclude from
national labour laws (Deshingkar 2009: 10–11), which is precisely where problems of child labour
have come recently to be concentrated (Phillips et al. 2014). Furthermore, arguments about political
compulsion and incentives against regulation are relevant to the more advanced economies, where
political dynamics between governments and big business, as well as ideological affinities between
them, have substantially the same outcomes in terms of a retraction of regulation.
Third, regulatory variation across states demonstrates that states retain considerable latitude in
determining their regulatory regime. We would expect and indeed do see an enlargement of state
regulatory capacity in larger economies with stronger states. In China, for example, legislative initiat-
ives such as the Labour Contract Law of 2008 represented an enhancement of the state’s enforce-
ment of labour and environmental laws, increasing the costs of production in China and
contributing to its strategic move from concentration in the lowest cost tiers of GVCs to higher
value-added production (Lan and Pickles 2011). Brazil has consistently pursued a model of neo-liber-
alism characterised by greater regulatory activism than many of the ‘purer’ versions. In the realm of
the governance of GVCs, the extent and scale of public regulation can be striking, as in the extensive
federal system to monitor labour standards and specifically to combat the problem of slavery in
supply chains, and the government’s decision in 2013 to sue the electronics lead firm Samsung for
some US$105 million over violations of labour standards in its factory in Manaus (Phillips and Saka-
moto 2012, Barros 2013). Yet, to date, the global net effect of outsourced production has been
reduced regulation by states.
Finally, we make a more fundamental critique of the theoretical premises on which this con-
ception of private governance is built. What may appear to be purely private forms of governance
are always and everywhere underpinned by particular kinds of interactions with state authority
and public governance. Private regulation is articulated in the ‘shadow of the state’ (Abbott and
Snidal 2009), and the state represents the ‘regulatory gorilla in the closet’ (Verbruggen 2013).
Here, we can draw on rich veins of insight in the literature which show how states and public govern-
ance are critical to promoting and shaping private governance, in a variety of ways: from the role of
political contestation in determining the forms that emerging regulatory institutions and mechan-
isms have taken (Bartley 2007), to how state regulatory capacity is critical to the enforcement of trans-
national private regulation (Verbruggen 2013), and the ‘governance triangle’ that sustains the
contemporary regulatory space (Abbott and Snidal 2009). These arguments need to be extended
in our context to capture the ways in which regulatory authority is explicitly ‘delegated’ or, in our
term here, ‘outsourced’ to private actors, where the explicit intention of state actors is to retract
the state’s direct control over particular arenas of regulation. This does not mean that the state
becomes inactive; rather, the process of outsourcing governance requires concerted political
action to promote and shape the resulting forms of private regulation, and the process is everywhere
shaped by intense, ongoing political contestation, with varied outcomes.
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Particularly notable in this respect is the role of the state in promoting CSR, including the mobil-
isation of its legislative authority ostensibly to integrate CSR into national legal frameworks. This has
taken different forms in different places. The state of California enacted ‘disclosure’ legislation in 2013
– the California Transparency in Supply Chains Act – to require firms doing business in that state to
report their activities and actions in relation to human trafficking in their supply chains. The UK gov-
ernment incorporated supply chain provisions modelled on the California legislation in its Modern
Slavery Act of 2015. In 2014, the Indian government passed legislation making CSR mandatory,
with provisions compelling both a minimum spending level on CSR by large firms and disclosure
requirements in annual reports and on websites.
Ostensibly, these initiatives represent a movement away from the primarily voluntaristic manner
in which CSR has been articulated, towards what has been termed ‘CSR as mandated by govern-
ment’ (Gond et al. 2011). However, it is a feature of disclosure-based legislation, including the Cali-
fornian, UK and Indian legislations, that they lack any clear sanctions for non-compliance, and any
regulatory or enforcement role for the governments enacting this legislation. The role of the state
here is deliberately legalistic and rhetorical, and this form of governance continues to rest on
private standards, defined by firms themselves. In this sense such initiatives tend not to be
moves towards ‘legally mandated private standards’ (Henson and Humphrey 2010), but only
moves towards mandatory disclosure – a model which in previous incarnations has an undistin-
guished record of commanding compliance with its requirements in the US and elsewhere
(Graham and Woods 2006: 878). Similarly, the dialogue that is envisaged in disclosure legislations
is not between firms and governments, but rather between firms and consumers or civil society.
Consequently, these need to be understood as interesting examples of new forms of state
action to promote private governance, rather than a re-assertion of public authority in regulatory
governance (Phillips 2013a).
One of the early pace-setting contributions in the debate about the rise of private authority
thus hit the mark exactly in its contention that private actors are ‘empowered either explicitly
or implicitly by governments and international organisations with the right to make decisions
for others’ (Cutler et al. 1999: 19). The thrust of this message has usually been taken as reinforcing
the importance of private authority, wherein the practice of implicit delegation leads business
essentially to emerge as an autonomous governance actor, and hence as underlining the impor-
tance of a concept of governance that does not rest on governments alone (Ougaard 2010: 24).
Yet it is equally apposite here for our contention that private governance does not function inde-
pendently of political dynamics in which public and private authority are entwined with one
another. States have enabled the ascendance of private governance and, following Cutler’s argu-
ment, actively empower private actors by delegating or ‘outsourcing’ governance functions.
Through their public policies, they continually act to extend its reach. ‘Delegated’ private auth-
ority in turn paves the way for ‘entrepreneurial’ forms of private authority, where private actors
generate their own roles and lead the political processes by which other actors are persuaded
to adopt them (Green 2014). Private governance in this sense is not always driven by states,
and is not necessarily directly sanctioned by states. The politics of the GVC world are shaped
by the dynamics of political conflict and contestation that emerge from the interplay of public
and private power. Yet, configurations of public authority, state preferences and institutions
may well be critical in determining the type of private authority that emerges, and, by extension,
the forms that regulatory governance takes (Bartley 2007, Green 2014). In empirical terms, there-
fore, the nature of the entwinement of public and private is contingent, and the type of govern-
ance that emerges will vary depending on the political-economic context, forms of state and the
structure of different GVCs.
To some extent, one could argue that such moves to ‘outsourced’ regulatory governance are a
positive development. In some forms of private governance, including those mentioned above,
states have discovered that they can harness the power of lead firms to regulate the behaviour of
suppliers. ‘Better Work Cambodia’ is a good example – addressed in the papers in this Symposium
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by Bair and Posthuma and Rossi – wherein private actors’ participation in monitoring labour rights
was made a condition for exporting under the US–Cambodia bilateral trade agreement (Polaski
2006). China’s use of Apple’s leverage over its supplier Foxconn to ensure compliance with
Chinese labour law may be another case in point (Mayer 2014). A case might be made that state
actors should strive to promote private regulatory governance, and then seek to engage and coor-
dinate with these private regulatory regimes, as a means of better achieving their own regulatory
objectives (Verbruggen 2013). Yet, a growing body of literature puts forward an argument, increas-
ingly pervasive in studies of CSR and global regulation, that private regulation has been insufficient to
secure improvements in social, labour and environmental standards, and that concerted forms of
public and private governance are required in combination to achieve this end (Wells 2007, Mayer
and Gereffi 2010, Vogel 2010, Taylor 2011, Esbenshade 2012, Locke 2013, Phillips 2013a). A focus
on an ‘orchestration’ function for states and international organisations has formed an interesting
part of this line of thought, focusing on the possibilities that might thereby be opened up for
novel, hybrid forms of governance capable of delivering a range of public goods (Abbott and
Snidal 2015). Yet there remains ample disagreement as to whether, or how, public and private regu-
latory governance can feasibly (in political terms) be shaped into a system of ‘complementarity’, and
our argument here has suggested a further tension between states’ actions to ‘outsource’ regulatory
authority, on the one hand, and calls upon state actors to assume a direct ‘orchestration’ role. A criti-
cal remaining question concerns which and whose interests are served by such a political project.
Here, we develop this latter line of thought in the final dimension of our three-fold governance
typology, namely, distributive governance.
Inequality in a GVC world: distributive governance
Inequality is not a ‘bug’ in the system of the GVC world, but rather an intrinsic feature of it. The ration-
ale for the globalisation of production, and specifically for structuring the productive economy
around GVCs, is precisely the creation and mobilisation of significant global asymmetries of
market power in the interests of generating and capturing profit (Gereffi et al. 2005, Kaplinsky
2005, Milberg and Winkler 2013). Creating these market asymmetries requires a structure in which
lead firms occupy oligopolistic positions – that is, positions of market dominance occupied by a
small number of very large firms. In the lower tiers of production, it rests on creating densely popu-
lated and intensely competitive markets (Milberg and Winkler 2013: 123–4). Such market structures
enable lead firms to transmit intense commercial pressures on conditions of price and supply along
the length of their supply chains. They maximise the process of value capture by varying these con-
ditions to their commercial advantage. At the extreme, where the asymmetries of power between
lead firms and suppliers are most pronounced, this process can involve varying the terms of
orders and the price to be paid per unit with no notice, cancelling orders in similar conditions,
forcing suppliers to halve the time agreed for production, or indeed the price, substantially increasing
orders, and obliging suppliers to meet these demands and conditions in order to retain contracts in
an intensely competitive environment.
These commercial pressures are largely absorbed by small producers and, most of all, by workers,
especially in the lower tiers of the value chain. In many contexts, suppliers’ strategies are shaped by a
perceived imperative to reduce the share represented by labour in input costs and enhance their
ability to manipulate those costs to accommodate highly variable commercial conditions. A direct
consequence is the growth of precarious, insecure and exploitative work as the hallmark of the con-
temporary global economy, performed by a highly vulnerable and disenfranchised workforce, signifi-
cantly made up of informal, migrant and contract workers (Portes et al. 1989, Barrientos 2008, Phillips
2011a). The regulatory dynamics we sketched in the previous section are strongly associated with the
facilitation of downward pressure on wages and conditions, and the far-reaching removal – or the
maintenance of the existing absence – of meaningful protections for workers. This is particularly
well documented in the ‘developing’ world, but encompasses all countries and regions: the
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growth of zero-hours contracts, the politics of minimum and ‘living’ wages, and the intense con-
testation surrounding work-related welfare are deeply entrenched phenomena across the world,
characteristic of varied kinds of labour markets with differential patterns of intersection with
global and regional value chains, and pivotal to the constitution and evolution of socio-economic
inequality.
In this sense, the logic of GVCs is not solely about the mobilisation of market asymmetry, but also
about the foundational dynamics of social asymmetry. Firms within value chains rely on the harnes-
sing and, indeed, active reproduction of a global labour force with the characteristics outlined
above, whose existence and availability are intimately connected with global patterns of poverty
and inequality across the world. To this extent, a proportion of the world’s ‘social marginals’ may
well exist in conditions of exclusion from employment in global production, but, with the spread
of GVCs and the expansion of employment within them, a far greater proportion than before are
now integrated into them (Phillips 2016). As noted in the Introduction to this Symposium, one in
five jobs worldwide is now estimated to be connected to employment in GVCs (ILO 2015). Inclusion
in GVCs undoubtedly has been associated with advantageous employment and earning opportu-
nities for some groups of workers. However, the dynamics of ‘adverse incorporation’ are also in
compelling evidence, wherein employment leads not to a reduction in poverty and vulnerability,
but to their perpetuation and deepening (Wood 2003, Hickey and du Toit 2007, Ponte 2008, Phillips
2011b, 2013b). The mechanisms by which this occurs are connected to the commercial dynamics of
GVCs, as outlined above. As evidence of the social outcomes of these processes, it is pertinent that
in 2012, the World Bank reported that, while the percentage of the world’s population living in
extreme poverty had fallen quite dramatically, the numbers living between the $1.25 per day
extreme poverty line and the $2 per day poverty line had almost doubled between 1981 and
2008, to reach 1.18 billion people (World Bank 2012). This ‘bunching up’, as the World Bank put
it, represents an expansion of the global ‘working poor’, whose growth in part has been propelled
by the expansion of precarious employment in GVCs and the dynamics of asymmetry and inequality
on which they are built.
In this sense, the distributive landscape in a GVC world is shaped by the economic logics of GVCs,
which are themselves shaped by the politics of governance. Besides facilitating the propagation of
a system that produces highly inequitable outcomes, as with regulatory governance states have
been outsourcing their role in distributive governance. In part, this is simply an artefact of the
shift of production to locations with less robust labour laws, pension and health systems, and
social protection. Yet, the role of the state in outsourcing distributive governance goes well
beyond this. For a variety of reasons, to a variety of extents, states have been choosing to abrogate
obligations in this realm. The neo-liberal agenda pushed by states as part of the structural adjust-
ment programmes and FTAs undermined a variety of policies with redistributive consequences.
Neo-liberalism pushed by one set of states shrank the ‘policy space’ available to others (Wade
2003). This included measures that shrank social protection in the name of fiscal responsibility,
scaled back worker protections in the name of competitiveness, ended subsidies for food and
water in the name of efficiency and enshrined less-progressive taxation as part of an effort to
improve the ‘business climate’. Beyond this, the expansion of investor rights provisions through
BITs and investment provisions of trade agreements also had the effect of limiting the set of dis-
tributive policies available to states. Furthermore, in the US and Western Europe, the social
welfare policies that constituted the social compact constructed in the second half of the twentieth
century have been under duress. On every front, from minimum wage policies, to progressive taxa-
tion, to public spending on social services, education and health care, to social insurance and pen-
sions, the welfare state is at bay. All of this can be seen as part of the choice by states, sometimes
coerced by other states or by powerful private actors, or both, to shrink their own social policy
space.
That states have been motivated in making these choices by the desire to attract or retain invest-
ment is well known. What has been less remarked, however, is the extent to which this strategy has
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been intimately connected to GVCs. At heart the rationale for a value chain, as outlined above, is to
minimise costs of production. Inevitably, all else equal, lead firms in value chains will seek to locate
production where they have – or can negotiate – maximum labour flexibility and minimal responsi-
bility for providing redistribution. Beyond that they have an incentive to advocate for policies that
reduce their distributive obligations, and to demand exemptions and compensations relating to
social obligations in negotiations for investment contracts.
The outsourcing of distributive governance seem highly unlikely to be satisfactory. Champions of
private governance can certainly point to examples of apparently successful forms of private distri-
butive governance. The Fair Trade movement, for example, is a system of private governance expli-
citly intended to provide better wages and job security for small-scale producers. But, to an even
greater extent than is the case with regulation, private governance has not and is highly unlikely
to come close to substituting adequately for public governance in the realms of distribution. Even
while public–private governance has been touted as a means of achieving better distributive out-
comes, we have noted that there is as yet little evidence of such a connection. We have also high-
lighted throughout the article the core tension that exists between the dynamics of ‘outsourcing
governance’ and the calls for a more concerted regulatory role for states, whether as direct regulatory
agents or as ‘orchestrators’.
Conclusion
We have argued in this article for a more engaged political economy perspective on the question of
governance in a GVC world, laying emphasis on the centrality of politics, states and public authority.
We have sought to contribute to the much wider effort that will be involved in bringing politics to the
centre of GVC/GPN debates by proposing a notion of ‘outsourcing governance’, as an attempt to
capture the ways in which states purposefully, through active political agency, have engaged in a
process of delegating a variety of governance functions and authority to private actors. We have,
therefore, foregrounded the centrality of the power and the agency that states articulate in the
GVC world. Our overarching point, in this sense, is that the core complexity of state agency and
state power needs to be much more carefully understood, as a basis on which the governance of
the evolving GVC world can be properly theorised. Such a project takes us a long way from the
notion that states are limited to playing a bit part in this new era of transnational governance, per-
forming the residual functions of protecting property, providing legal frameworks or fine-tuning
domestic economic policy, towards a much more theoretically, analytically and empirically challen-
ging agenda for GVC/GPN research.
Taken together, the strands of our discussion paint a somewhat dark picture of the empirical impli-
cations of outsourced governance. The public facilitation of GVCs, a privately governed form of indus-
trial organisation, has been highly effective, and its absorption into the agendas of both national
governments and international organisations indicate that facilitation will form the focus of global
economic governance for some time to come. The efficacy of the emerging schema of private regu-
latory governance, on the other hand has been far from even, and there is little evidence yet that
public–private governance can perform much better, or indeed crystallise meaningfully in the
context of the tensions we have identified here. Distributive governance has been a casualty of
many of the dynamics and forms of governance associated with facilitation and regulation, and,
while states remain the primary vehicles by which progressive distributive governance outcomes
can be achieved, their agency and authority remains oriented towards advancing forms of govern-
ance in a GVC world which, we argue, are antithetical to such outcomes.
The good news, however, is that by arguing that this system is the outcome of choice made by
states, because state behaviour is an outcome of politics, there is a possibility of a political solution.
It should be possible to push back at this system, not to abandon private governance where it is
useful, nor to return to traditional statist models, but to reengage the state in the pursuit of more
equitable and sustainable development.
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Note
1. There is an ongoing, often unfortunately acrimonious debate between the GVC and GPN formulations and their
relative merits. We use the term GVC here not to land on one side or other of this dispute, but rather simply as a
shorthand, based on our conviction that the divides and differences between the two intellectual ‘brands’ are too
often overplayed. In this article, we draw constructively and widely on the wonderfully rich resources that both
strands of the literature have to offer our project of foregrounding the politics of the contemporary global
economy.
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